How Metasophism takes postmodernism seriously

Arnold Kling has posted an interesting review of Cynical Theories by Helen Pluckrose and James Lindsay. According to Kling, Pluckrose and Lindsay:

describe postmodern Theory as having evolved in three phases. The first phase was simply the original postmodernism, as developed in the 1960s and 1970s. The second phase, which took place in the late 20th century and early 21st, PL term “applied postmodernism,” meaning that it applied the methods of postmodernism to particular realms, including colonialism, race, and gender. The third phase, which began around 2010, they call “reified postmodernism,” which emphasizes real-world activism.

PL describe postmodernism as a system of thought grounded in two principles and having four themes.

The postmodern knowledge principle: Radical skepticism about whether objective knowledge or truth is obtainable and a commitment to cultural constructivism.

The postmodern political principle: A belief that society is formed of systems of power and hierarchies, which decide what can be known and how.

I’m sympathetic to original postmodernism and the idea that we should be skeptical of anything proposed as an absolute truth.

It is therefore important that the pathologies of reified postmodernism (notably the proclivity for violence) don’t discredit the original. If society is to survive, then we need to reduce our reliance on sacred principles as a way of generating social cohesion. Because in a quickly changing world, sacralising values, laws, and institutions inhibits the ability of society to adapt, putting its survival into question. Arnold Toynbee already saw that as being the seed of decline for societies in the past. Given that the rate of societal change has increased, this risk has grown in importance.

So in contrast to what many think, original postmodernism has a role in helping society survive.

Thankfully, reified postmodernism is very exposed to the critique of the original. If “Theory” is to be stopped, then the best way forward is to propose another ideology robust to the critique of original postmodernism. This new ideology would then be able to apply that same critique pretty mercilessly against the reified version.

That is what I try to do with Metasophism, which tries to integrate the critique of original postmodernism by only holding one sacred principle: that the mission for humanity should be to acquire knowledge and survive, in the hope that one day we may discover some objective idea of good — if it actually exists.

That valorises knowledge and its production, without putting any set of values on a pedestal: an ideology that incubates sub-ideologies, while not allowing any individual one to dominate — thereby forcing them to be prestige hierarchies rather than dominance hierarchies.